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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 14109

v.
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a
Minnesota corporation,
Defendant-Respondent,

APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DISMISSAL AND THE DENIAL OF MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR RELIEF
FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT
COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, HONORABLE
STEWART M. HANSON, JR., JUDGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by the insured (The Continental Bank and Trust Company) to recover against the
insurer (St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company)
under a Banker's Blanket Bond for payments made by the %
insured in settlement of claims against the insured and
for its attorneys' fees and costs in defense of said
claims plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in
prosecution of this action against the insurer.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
l

On March 24, 1974 the District Court, without
making findings of fact or conclusions of lav/, granted

J

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed
i

plaintiff's Complaint (R. 23-24).*/ on May 12, 1974 the

,

District Court, again without making findings of fact or

i

conclusions of law, denied with prejudice plaintiff's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief from
Judgment and granted plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories.

(R. 8-9)

,
i

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
<i

Appellant seeks (1) to have the District
Court's orders granting Summary Judgment and dismissing

«

the Complaint and denying plaintiff's Motion to Alter or

f

i

Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment reversed and
i

(2) to have the case remanded for a determination by the
District Court as to whether the plaintiff's good faith
in making the settlement is at issue and for appropriate

*

further proceedings upon such a determination.

,
i

«
j

*/

— "R. 23-24" refers to pages in the Record of
this case as filed with the Clerk of this Court on July 1,
1975.

i
'

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action for recovery of settlement payments,
attorneys1 fees and costs by The Continental Bank and
Trust Company (hereinafter "Bank") arises out of the
settlement of claims against the Bank in Clark Tank Lines
v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., in the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County.
*/

199003).-

(Civil Action No.

In the Clark Tank Lines suit, the plaintiffs

therein, in their Second Amended Complaint, sought damages
of $650,802.95 against the Bank.

(R-E 130-143) . —

i n the

first two causes of action, plaintiffs alleged that
J. M. Stoof presented two checks (one for $32,500.00
and the other for $10,272.22) to the Bank, each drawn on
accounts of one of the plaintiffs.

With respect to each

such check, plaintiffs alleged that the Bank wrongfully

~" This settlement with Continental Bank was part of
a blanket settlement involving four other banks who had
also been sued by Clark Tank Lines and others for claiifis
arising out of the activities of J. M. Stoof. See the
following cases in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County: Clark Tank
Lines Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, Civil No. 198981;
Clark Tank Lines Co., Inc. v. Utah Bank & Trust, Civil
No. 199006; Harms Pacific Transport, Inc. and Clark Tank
Lines Co., Inc. v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A.,
Civil No. 199005; Clark Tank Lines Company, Inc. v. Zions
First National Bank, Civil No. 199004. (R. .16-17)
I V " I M S . 130-143" refers to pages in the file in
Clark Tank Lines v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., Civil
Action No. 199003 which is an Exhibit in the record before
this Court.

-3-

paid or credited the proceeds of the check to J. M. Stoof,
converted the checks to its own use, had actual knowledge

j

that J. M. Stoof had no authority to receive the proceeds

,
J

of the checks and credited the checks to J. M. Stoof in
!

bad faith.

With respect to the first two causes of action,

plaintiff prayed for damages against the Bank in the
amount of $42,722.22. In the Fifth Cause of Action
plaintiffs alleged that the Bank aided and abetted J. M.

•
!

Stoof in his dealings with respect to said checks and
i

transactions and through its acts and omissions prevented
plaintiffs from learning of the embezzlements and defalcations of J. M. Stoof so that plaintiff could have

*

avoided or minimized their losses from the wrongful acts

•
i

of J. M. Stoof.

With respect to the Fifth Cause of

Action, plaintiffs sought general damages against the
Bank in the amount of $600,000.00.
During the course of discovery in the Clark
Tank Lines suit, testimony was given under oath that J. M.

•
•
li

Stoof obtained, completed and materially altered the
n
checks without authorization and through fraudulent
misrepresentations with the intent to defraud and convert said checks to his own use.

(R. 17)

Mr. Robert

Clark, President of Clark Tank Lines, testified in his

•
•
m

deposition that the signatories to the $32,500.00 check,
m
Mr. Murdock and Mr. Maddux, signed the check in blank

and delivered it to J. M. Stoof who wrongfully and without authority filled out the date, amount and payee of
the check and deposited it in his personal account.
(R. 17)

With regard to the $10,272.22 check, a serious

evidentiary question arose as to whether the date and
amount of the check were filled in by Stoof after the
check was signed by Mr. Robert Clark who instructed Stoof
to use the check to pay off loans to Mr. Robert Clark
and D. L. Boulden from Continental Bank.

(R. 17)

(This

evidentiary question, of course, was not resolved because
the lawsuit was settled prior to trial.)

Stoof then con-

verted the $10,272.22 check to his own use.

(R. 17)

J. M.

Stoof plead guilty in the United States District Court,
District of Utah, to 95 counts of embezzlement, thereby
admitting he had improperly issued and altered checks
including those for which the Bank was sued by Clark Tank
Lines and used the proceeds for his own use.

(R # X7)

Upon Clark Tank Lines' amendment to its
Complaint against the Bank to include the specific
allegation of dishonesty by the Bank, the Bank's counsel
made oral inquiry of Randon Wilson, one of the attorneys
for Clark Tank Lines, as to the factual basis for such

—Details of these transactions may be even more
available to counsel for St. Paul inasmuch as St. Paul's
counsel's firm represented Stoof.

-5-

allegation.

Bank's counsel was informed by Mr. Wilson

that in the opinion of Clark Tank Lines' counsel, sufficient evidence existed to justify such an allegation and
that they had reason to believe that an employee or
employees of the Bank had acted dishonestly, but gave no
specific facts.

(R. 18)

The lav/suit was settled prior

to any formal discovery as to the basis for their allegations of dishonesty.
At all times relevant to the Clark Tank Lines
suit, Bank was insured by Banker's Blanket Bond No.
400 CP 5227 issued by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company (hereinafter "St. Paul")

(R. 55, 5 2 ) . The bond

provides in part:
The St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company
. . . in consideration of agreed premiums and
subject to these Declarations the General
Conditions of this Bond and the terms and
limitations expressed in its Insuring Clauses,
agrees to indemnify the Insured . . . frcrr. and
against any losses sustained by the Insured as
the result of any of the occurences or events
mentioned in the Bond . . . .
(R. 62)
Among the "events or occurrences" mentioned in
the bond are those detailed in Insurance Clause "D" :
The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the Insured
to any amount not exceeding the amount stated
in the Declarations for this Insuring Clause,
or endorsement amendatory thereto, from and
against any loss through FORGERY OR ALTERATION
of, on or in any checks . . . .
(R. 67)
Also mentioned in the bond are the "events or
occurrences" detailed in Insuring Clause "A":

The Underwriter agrees to indemnify the Insured
. . . from and against any loss . . . by reason
of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of
any of the employees, whenever committed and
whether acting alone or in collusion with others
. . . .
(R. 66)
Under both clauses of the bond the limit of
St. Paul's liability is $2,200,000.00 limited to the excess of the loss to the Bank over $5,000.00.

(R. 56, 43)

In addition the bond provides:
The Underwriter will indemnify the
Insured against court costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees incurred and paid by the
Insured in defending any suit or legal proceeding brought against the Insured to enforce
the Insured's liability or alleged liability
on account of any loss, claim or damage which
if established against the Insured, would
constitute a valid and collectible loss sustained by the Insured under the terms of this
bond. Such indemnity shall be in addition to
the amount otherwise recoverable under this
bond.
(R. 64)
St. Paul has admitted that it was kept fully
informed by the Bank of the proceedings in the Clark Tank
Lines suit and that on frequent occasions the Bank requested, and St. Paul refused, to assume liability for
and the defense of the claims against the Bank.
52)

(R. 56,

St. Paul also admits that it was informed of the

settlement proposal.

It is undisputed that the Bank settled

all claims against it in the Clark Tank Lines suit for
$15,600.00 and expended $13,330.91 in attorneys' fees and
costs in defense of the claims against it.

(R. 56, 52, 53)

On or about September 22, 1972 the Bank gave St. Paul

-7-

affirmative proof of loss with full particulars.
denied the Bank's claim.

St. Paul

(R. 57, 52, 53)

ARGUMENT
I.

TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE NONE OF THE GROUNDS ADVANCED BY DEFENDANT.
ENTITLES IT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The appellant in seeking reversal of the trial

court's action (and this Court in reviewing that action)
must labor under the burden created by the trial court's
failure to set forth its reasons for granting the defen-

i

dant's motion and denying plaintiff's motion.

x

The trial

4

court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law or
i

any other statement as to the reasons for its actions;
it simply granted the defendant's.Motion for Summary
Judgment/ dismissed each cause of action with prejudice

i

(R. 21-22) and denied plaintiff's Motion to Alter or

«
i

Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment.

(R. 8-9)
i

The record before the trial court consisted
i

essentially of the Complaint, Answer, and the Bank's
answers and supplemental answers to St.-Paul's inter-

\

rogatories.

1

Since St. Paul did not submit any support-

i

ing affidavits and since summary judgment cannot be
*/

*

granted if there are any disputed material facts,—
the factual allegations in the Bank's Complaint and the
•

1

*/

~ Burningham v. Ott,
(1974).

Utah 2d
-8-

, 525 P. 2d 620

•
,

Bank's answers to interrogatories must be taken as
true.

That is, in order for St. Paul to be entitled to

summary judgment, it must establish that as a matter of
law the Bank could not prevail at trial on any of its
causes of action even if all the factual allegations in
the Complaint and Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories
are true.

See Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., Utah

Supreme Court, No. 13925 (July 8, 1975); Tanner v. Utah
Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18
(1961).

The Bank, on the other hand, need only state.a

cause of action in order to survive St. Paul's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
The Bank, however, can do better than that.

In

this section of the Argument the Bank will take up each
of St. Paul's grounds advanced in its Motion for Summary
Judgment and demonstrate why, under any or all of those
grounds, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment
and dismissal of the Complaint.
A.

A Check May be "Altered or Forged" By a
Person Who Completes the Check in a Manner
Otherwise than Authorized Regardless of
Whether or not that Person is an Authorized
Signatory.
The Bank alleged in paragraphs 17, 21, 22, and 23

of the Complaint against St. Paul that:

,f

J. Moroni Stoof

obtained, completed and materially altered said checks with-

-9-

out authorization," that such conduct constituted forgery
and alteration and that, therefore, the settlement was a
loss to the Bank through forgery and alteration.
58)

(R. 57,

The defendant, however, moved to dismiss the Bank's

claim of loss through forged or altered checks for
"failure to state a claim" on the grounds that
(1) the complaint does not allege J* Moroni Stoof
and other signatories were not authorized signatories to the checks drawn on Old National Bank of
Washington and Clearfield State Bank, and hence the
checks could not be forged checks, and in that (2)
the complaint alleges said checks were signed in
blank and hence were not altered checks. . . .
(R. 34)
Neither of these

grounds entitles the defendant to

summary judgment because under applicable statutory authority and case law,

both checks were "altered" and/or "forged"

within the meaning of those terms. And whatever vagueness or
ambiguity there may be in these terms, such ambiguity must
be construed in favor of the Bank since it is a fundamental
principle of law that doubtful or ambiguous terms in insurance policies are construed against the insurer and courts
will construe such terms liberally "in favor of the insured
to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was taken
out."

Tucker v.

New York Life Insurance Co., 107 Utah

478, 155 P.2d 173, 175 (1945); Fidelity &- Casualty Co. of
New York v. Reese, 223 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1955); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. American Compounding Co.,

-10-

211 Ala. 593, 100 So. 904 (1924).

Moreover, "the words

'banker's blanket bond1 are used to indicate a broad and
liberal construction which is placed upon the terms and
conditions of the insurance policy."

St. Paul Fire &

Marine Insurance Co. v. Leflore Bank & Trust Co., 181 So.2d
913 (Miss. 1966); Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., 482 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1971).
Section 70A-3-407 of the Utah Code defines
"alteration" as follows:
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is materialwhich changes the contract of any party thereto
in any respect, including any change in
•

• • •

(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed by adding to
it or removing any part of it.
The Bank's Complaint alleges that Stoof took these
checks and completed them otherwise than authorized.
Thus, under the express terms of the statute the Bank's
Complaint on its face alleges facts which constitute
"alteration."

Therefore, defendant's argument that the

Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim because the "checks were signed in blank and hence
were not altered checks" is clearly wrong and cannot have
been a valid basis for dismissing the Complaint.

Moreover,

although unnecessary to defeat defendant's motion for dis-

-11-

missal for failure to state a claim, the facts in the
Record clearly show that at least one of the checks (the
$32,500.00 check) was altered by J. Moroni Stoof within
the meaning of Section 70A-3-407 U.C.A. and that the other
check also may have been altered (the $10,272.22 check)
within the meaning of the Code.

(R. 17)

The bond issued by St. Paul, by the use of the
conjunction "or," provides for recovery for any loss
suffered either through forgery or alteration.

Thus,

if

the Bank's Complaint states a claim for loss through
"alteration," it is not necessary that the Complaint also
state a claim for loss through "forgery."
Nevertheless, the Bank's Complaint on its face
states a claim for loss through forgery because an authorized signatory can still be a forger.

Thus, the trial court

would be in error if it found, as defendant urged in its
motion for dismissal, that because the Complaint does not
allege that Stoof and the other signatory were not authorized signatories, the checks could not be forged checks.
Courts have construed the term "forgery" to
include both (1) the procurement of admittedly genuine
signatures as a result of material misrepresentations
concerning the instrument's content or purpose; or (2)
the signing of the admittedly genuine or otherwise authorized signature for an unauthorized purpose, usually by

-12-

an agent to defraud its principal.

Quick Service Box Co.

v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 95 F.2d 15 (7th Cir.
1938); Turner v. Nicholson, 241 P. 750 (Okla. 1925); People
v. Howard, 116 P.2d 802 (Cal. App. 1941).

In Quick Service,

for example, the court ruled in favor of the insured when
it attempted to recover on its bond against losses through
forgery where an office manager exceeded his authority to
sign checks by making checks payable to fictitious persons
or to cash.

The court rejected the insurer's contention

that there could be no forgery since the office manager
had signed his own name.

Thus, even if Stoof and the other

signatory were authorized signatories to the checks which
caused the Bank's loss, Stoof's actions with respect to
both checks still constitute

forgery.

Some courts have concluded that the term
"forgery" in insurance policies refers to those acts
punishable under the crime of forgery and have held that
acts similar to those committed by Stoof constitute

J
forgery.

The Utah Penal Code in effect at the time of

*/

— Provident Trust Co. v. National Surety Corp., 138
F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1943) (forgery committed even though
signatures not actually forged); Quick Service Box Co. v.
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 95 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1938);
Century Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins; Co.,482 P.2d
193 (Cal, 1971) (forgery defined in criminal law sense,
not in accordance with common usage); See, Hicks v. Georgia,
168 S.E. 899, 87 A.L.R. 1166; People v. Kubanek, 370 111.
646, 650, 19 N.E.2d 573 (1939) (filling in blanks other than
as authorized constitutes forgery within the meaning of the
Illinois statute; International Union Bank v. National
Surety Co., 157 N.E. 269 (N.Y. 1927).
-13-

Stoof f s activities defined forgery to include both the
altering and the passing of altered instruments—

- acts

which Stoof committed:
Every person who with the intent to defraud
another, falsely makes, alters, forges . . .
any . . . check . ... . or utters, publishes or
passes, or attempts to pass, as true or genuine
any of the above-named false, altered, forged
. . . matters . . . knowing the same to be false,
altered, forged or counterfeited with the intent
to prejudice, damage or defraud or damage any
person . . . is guilty of forgery.
[Emphasis
Added] 72-26-1 U.C.A.
St. Paul chose the term forgery knowing the
expansive definitions which have been given the term.
Thus, since the Bank f s Complaint alleges (and St. Paul
does not and cannot dispute in seeking summary judgment)
that Stoof altered the checks by completing them otherwise
than authorized with the intent to defraud, the Complaint
states a claim for loss through forgery.

B.

There is Ample Evidence in the Record
That Stoof Altered or Forged the Checks
Which Caused the Bank f s Loss and in Any
Event the Trial Court's Action in
Granting Defendant's Motion Erroneously
Cut Off an Opportunity for the Bank to
Produce Such Evidence at Trial.

- S e e , e.g. State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d
656 where under an earlier but similar forgery statute,
Gorham was convicted of knowingly passing a forged
instrument.
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In seeking dismissal of the Bank's claim of
loss through forgery or altered checks under Insuring Clause
"D", St. Paul in the alternative urged that summary judgment
be granted because
[P]laintiff's answers to interrogatories nos.
1 and 2 dated April 19, 1974, plaintiff has no
evidence or understanding how said checks were
signed in blank, were forged, or were obtained,
completed or materially altered without authorization and through fraudulent misrepresentation by J. Moroni Stoof.. (R. 34-35)
There are at least three reasons why St. Paul's
contention must be rejected.

First, any basis that there

may have been for granting summary judgment on this ground
is no longer present since the trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion for leave to supplement its answers to
the interrogatories.

(R. 8-9)

Those supplemental answers

state the Bank's understanding of Stoof's alteration or
forgeries as obtained through discovery in the Clark
Tank Lines suit.

(R. 17)

That evidence shows that J.

Moroni Stoof took the $32,500.00 check which was signed
in blank and wrongfully and without authority filled
out the date, amount and payee of the check and deposited
it in his personal account.

Discovery in the Clark

Tank Lines suit also indicates a serious evidentiary
question as to whether J. Moroni Stoof likewise without
authority filled in the amount and date of the $10,272.22
check after it was delivered to him.
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(R. 17)

Secondly, whether the Bank had reason to believe
that Stoof had altered or forged the checks is in essence
a question of fact going to the Bank's good faith in making
settlement.

Whether or not the Bank's good faith is at

issue was not yet clear when the trial court granted summary judgment.

*/

(R. 43-44)—

But if such a factual question

is controverted, a motion for summary judgment should not
be granted.

Trone v. Pacific Wholesale Supply Co., Utah

Supreme Court, No. 13810 (April 28, 1975) ; Burningham v.
Ott,

Utah 2d

, 525 P.2d 620 (1974).

If the

Bank's good faith is not disputed then summary judgment
should be granted for the Bank.

6 Moore's Federal Practice

1(56.12.
Thirdly, if the Bank, contrary to what it
believes the law to be, is required to prove that J. M.
Stoof in fact altered or forged the two checks, whether or
"k * /

not Stoof did so may at best—' be a controverted factual

- I n answering Bank's Requests for Admissions that
the settlement was in good faith, St. Paul answered:
"Denied for lack of information or knowledge, reasonable
inquiry having been made; the information knovm or readily
obtainable is insufficient to enable admission or denial
at this time, but there is no evidence now known which
directly indicates the settlement was not in good faith."
(R. 43-44)
— We say "at best" because it is uncontroverted in
the record in its present posture that Stoof wrongfully
completed the $32,500.00 check without authority. (R. 17)
St.Paul has filed no counter affidavits or other evidence
putting at issue the question of whether Stoof completed
the $32,500.00 check without authority.
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question.

As noted above, for St. Paul to be entitled to

summary judgment there must be no material factual
questions in controversy.
C.

In Order to State a Claim for Loss Due to
Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts of its Employees
the Bank Need Only Allege that the Claims
Against it in the Clark Tank Lines Suit, if
Established, would Constitute Dishonest or
Fraudulent Acts by or of its Employees And
to Hold Otherwise Would Greatly Discourage
Settlements.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Bank's claims of

loss under Insurance Clause "A"
For failure to state a claim, in that the Second
Cause of Action does not allege loss by reason
of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act
of any employee of plaintiff nor does it allege
any employee of plaintiff converted funds, paid
such checks in bad faith with the actual knowledge
of Stoof's lack of authority, or aided and
abetted Stoof. (R. 35).
In advancing this ground for dismissing the
Complaint as to Clause "A", St. Paul is taking a slightly
different tact from its arguments as to Clause "D".
St. Paul did not argue that if the acts allegedly committed by the Bank's employees actually occurred, such
*/
acts would not constitute a "dishonest"—
or "fraudulent"

— The Clark Tank Lines complaint alleged that the
Bank paid these checks in "bad faith." This Court has
held that bad faith alone implies dishonesty. Sugarhouse
Finance Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68,
440 P.2d 869 (1968).

-17-

act under Clause "A" of the bond.
concedes that.

St. Paul implicitly

Rather St. Paul argued that the Bank

did not state a claim because the Bank did not allege
that these dishonest or fraudulent acts of the Bankfs
employees in fact occurred.

This cannot be the law.

Whether or not the Bank's employees paid the checks in
bad faith with actual knowledge of Stoof's lack of
authority or aided and abetted Stoof in his embezzlements
from Clark Tank Lines was at issue in the Clark Tank
Lines suit.

That suit was settled without any resolution

of whether or not these dishonest or fraudulent acts
occurred.

Surely the Bank as the insured cannot be

required to go through the charade of trying the lawsuit
it settled (and this time against itself) in order to
recover for a settlement of claims against it which, if
established, would clearly constitute a loss recoverable
under Insuring Clause "A" of the bond.

Such a require-

ment would put insureds in an impossible position since
one reason for settlement is that both sides are not
certain of their proof.
Thus,

the courts have consistently held that

where a claim is made against the insured which, if
established, falls within the scope of the policy, the
insurer is bound to pay the amount of any settlement made
in good faith by the insured.
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Couch on Insurance 2nd

§51:54; St. Louis Dress Beef and Provision Co. v. MarylandCasualty Co. , 201 U.S. 173 (1906); Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hildebrand, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir., 1941);
Russ-Field Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 330
P.2d 432, 440 (Cal. App. 1958).
In Russ-FieId, for example, the court found that:
[b]y the terms of the instant contract the
insurer was not obligated to defend the insured against asserted claims. But when the
insurer denied coverage and disclaimed the
. liability, the insured acquired the right to
make any reasonable and bona fide compromise
of the claim against it. Ritchie v. Anchor
Casualty Co., 135 Cal. App.2d 245, 258, 268
P.2d 1000; Lamb v. Bell Casualty Co., 3 Cal.
App.2d 624, 630, 40 P.2d 311. Id. at 440.
Like the insurer in Russ-Field, St. Paul was not obligated to defend the Bank in its defense of the claims
against it in the Clark Tank Lines suit, although St. Paul
had the option to do so.

(R. 64)

But having declined

to defend the insured and the insured having settled the
claim, "it was not necessary for the trial court to find
that . . . [the insured had in fact committed an act covered
under the policy] in order to find a loss for which the
appellant [the insurer] was liable."
Thus,

Id. at 440-441.

the Bank has satisfied its burden of alleging

in its Complaint that claims were made against it, which, if
established, would have constituted a loss through dishonesty
of its employees and that it settled these claims. To
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require, as defendant's position would require, that the
insured could only recover from its insurer if the insured
had a judgment entered against it for claims covered by the
policy (or at least was positive enough that the allegations
against it were true so that it would be willing to allege
them as true in its complaint against the insured company to
recover any settlement costs) would obviously provide the
insured with very little incentive to compromise.

Courts

have frequently recognized the policy favoring settlements
or compromises of lawsuits.

Williams v. First National Bank,

216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Moses Echo Co. v. Roscoe-Ajax Corp.,
320 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir., 1963).

Settlements avoid waste

of time and resources and often provide the parties with a
more satisfactory result than if they had "won" after long
and expensive litigation.

Moreover, a failure to settle

could cause an even greater liability for both the insured
and the insurer should the insured be found liable for the
claims against it.

An insured should not be forced to .take

this risk, and since the insurer bears the ultimate risk, it
would seem contrary to the insurer's interest to be urging a
position to this Court which would increase this risk.
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D.

The Bank Need Not Have Personal Knowledge
That Its Employees Committed Dishonest or
Fraudulent Acts, in Order to Recover from
St. Paul the Amount Paid by the Bank in
Settlement of Such Claims.
In moving to dismiss the Bank's claims of loss

under Insuring Clause "A", defendant moved in the
alternative:
Upon summary judgment, in that by answers to
interrogatories nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 dated
April 19, 1974, plaintiff admits it had no
knowledge of which employees, and does not
allege any employees, of plaintiff acted in
bad faith and with actual knowledge of
Stoof's lack of authority, aided and abetted
Stoof, converted funds or were dishonest,
fraudulent or acted or committed criminal
acts with respect to the loss claimed. (R. 35)
As with defendant's arguments supporting summary judgment for Bank's claims of loss under Insuring
Clause "D" based on the Bank's Answers to Interrogatories
dated April 19, 1974, any basis for granting summary judgment on such grounds has been removed by the Bank's
supplemental answers.

In its Supplemental Answers to

Interrogatories, the Bank through its counsel stated
that counsel for Clark Tank Lines gave it reason to
believe that there was sufficient evidence to justify
allegations of dishonesty but that the lawsuit was
settled prior to any discovery as to the basis of these
allegations.

(R. 18)

Moreover, as demonstrated above,

it is not necessary for the Bank to have personal
knowledge that the allegations against it are true.
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It

is enough that claims were made against the Bank, which
if established against it would constitute a recoverable
loss under Insuring Clause "A" and that the Bank settled
such claims.

As with the Bank's claim for recovering for

a loss under Insuring Clause '"D", the question of the
Bank's good faith in making this settlement, even assuming
it is an issue, cannot be resolved on a motion for summary
judgment.

Likewise, if the Bank, contrary to what it

believes the law to be, is required to prove that the Bank's
employees acted dishonestly, then whether or not the
employees did so may also be a controverted factual question.
E.

The Trial Court's Dismissal and Granting
of Summary Judgment Must be Reversed if
the Bank Has Stated a Claim for a Loss
Under Either Clause "D" or Clause "A".
This Court need only find that the Bank stated

a claim for loss under either Insuring Clause "D" (ALTERATION OR FORGERY) or "A" (Dishonesty) in order for this
Court to reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

It is not necessary for this Court to find that

the Bank has stated a claim for loss under both clauses.
This is especially true since no statement or finding was
made in the Clark Tank Lines settlement allocating the
amount of settlement among the various causes of action.
Where no allocation is made of the settlement amount
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between claims against the insured, some of v/hich were
covered by the policy and some of which were not, the
insurer is liable for the entire sum.

St. Paul Fire &

Marine Insurance Co. v. Icard, Merrill, Cullis & Timm,
196 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1967);'Couch on Insurance, §51:54.
F.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary
Judgment Because the Evidence Would Sustain a Finding That the Bank Suffered
Loss Due to "Larceny" by Stoof Which is
Recoverable under Clause "B" of the
bond.
In" Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Guaranty Bank

& Trust Co., 370 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1966) the court held,
in a fact situation very similar to the instant case, that
Guaranty Bank suffered loss through larceny and was entitled
*/

to indemnification by the insurer under Cluase "B"—7 (identical to Clauses of the St. Paul bond).

There, the office

manager of the drawer (Sandler-ette) wrongfully cashed 172
of the drawer's checks aided by the apparent negligence of
Guaranty's employees.

As in the instant case, the office

manager had no authority to negotiate the checks in the
manner in which he did.

Similarly, Guaranty was sued by

-'Clause "B" covers
any loss of Property through robbery, common-law
or statutory larceny . „ . whether effected with
or without violence or with or without negligence
on the part of any of the Employees . . . .
(R. 66)
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the drawer, the insurer refused to assume the defense and
Guaranty settled with the drawer.

Id. at 277-280.

The

court held that the settlement constituted a loss through
forgery finding that every time the office manager wrongfully cashed the checks, "the bank paid out its' money."
Id. at 280.
During the time period of Stoof's alleged
activities, the Utah Code defined larceny as "the
felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving
away the personal property of another."

*/

§76-38-1—

There

is uncontroverted evidence in the record that Stoof
wrongfully caused the Clark Tank Lines checks to be
deposited in his account at the Bank and that Stoof later
wrote and caused to be presented to the Bank checks on
the resulting funds in his account.

(R-E. 62-63)

Stoof's

causing the Bank to pay the checks he wrote on his account
at the Bank is no less larceny than the Sandler-ette office
manager's wrongful cashing of his employer's checks.
are a felonious taking of the Bank's money.

Both

Under Rule

15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Bank is
entitled to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence
and such amendment may be made "even after judgment."

-This Section was later repealed.
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§76-10-1401 U.C.A.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR ST. PAUL BECAUSE THE BANK
IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE FACE OF THE PLEADING
UNLESS ST. PAUL DISPUTES THE BANK'S GOOD FAITH IN
MAKING SETTLEMENT OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE BANK.
As demonstrated above, the pleadings alone were

enough to defeat St. Paul's motion for dismissal and
summary judgment.

But the pleadings, combined with other

evidence in the Record, establish more than that.

Discovery

in the Clark Tank Lines suit shows that J. M. Stoof completed a $32,500.00 check otherwise than authorized and
may have similarly completed a $10,272.22 check.

(R. 17)

As a matter of law, these acts of Stoof constitute
forgery and/or alteration.

(See pp. 8-13, supra)

Had the

Clark Tank Lines suit not been settled and had the Bank
been found liable, the judgment entered against the
Bank would have been a "loss through forgery or alteration
of, on or in any check" which St. Paul agreed to indemnify
against in Insuring Clause "D".

(R. 67)

This would be

so whether or not there were other contributing factors,
including the Bank's negligence which caused the Bank to
be found liable.

Thus, in Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of

Troy v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 218 N.Y.S.
332, 218 App. Div. 455 (1922), the court construed
"through" in a Banker's Blanket Bond to mean "by means
of, as a consequence of, or by reason of," and held that
it applied to direct or indirect causation.
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Likewise it is clear that if the claims against
the Bank that the Bank's employees fraudulently or dishonestly aided and abetted Stoof in his embezzlement had
been established at the Clark Tank Lines trial, any judgment
entered against the Bank would have constituted a valid and
collectible loss under Insuring Clause "A" ("Dishonesty")
of the St. Paul bond.
Thus, if the Bank had been found liable in the
Clark Tank Lines suit and any judgment entered against it,
this would have been a valid and-collectible loss under
Clauses "A" and "p'\

St. Paul's liability to the Bank

,

cannot be any different simply because the Bank settled

<

these claims, unless St. Paul can establish that the

l

Bank's settlement was not in good faith.

l

To hold

i

otherwise would put any insured in an impossible situation.
i

As in this case, what more could the Bank have done?

4

St. Paul admits that it was fully informed of the

§

proceedings in the Clark Tank Lines suit, that it

i
%

refused to undertake the Bank's defense, and that it

i
i

refused to counsel the Bank as to whether to accept the
«

settlement.

Insurers simply cannot be allowed to

t

escape liability because the insured takes the judicially

f

encouraged settlement course rather than consume its

*

own (and the judicial system's) resources in a long and

f

m

expensive lawsuit.

St. Paul, by refusing to assume the

Bank's defense, took the risk that the Bank would•
settle claims which the Bank might have been able.to
defend against successfully at trial.

Having taken

that risk St. Paul cannot be heard to say that the
claims could have been beaten back at trial or that the
Bank must prove the claims against itself in order to
recover from St. Paul.
St. Paul's only possible defense to the Bank's
claims against it under Insuring Glauses "A" and "D" is that
the Bank's settlement was not in good faith.

Thus, this

Court should reverse the judgment below and remand the
case with instructions that the trial court determine
whether the question of the Bank's good faith is at
issue.

If the Bank's good faith is not at issue the

trial court should be directed to enter judgment for
the Bank.

If the Bank's good faith is at issue the

trial court should be directed to conduct further
proceedings solely on that issue.
III. EVEN IF ST. PAUL IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
UNDER CLAUSES "A" AND "D" OR EVEN IF THE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT IN GOOD FAITH, THE BANK IS ENTITLED
TO RECOVER ITS ATTORNEYSf FEES AND COSTS IN
DEFENSE OF THE CLARK TANK LINES SUIT.
The St. Paul bond provides that in addition to
recovery for other losses under the bond, St. Paul will
indemnify the Bank against court costs and reasonable
attorneys1 fees
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incurred and paid by the insured in defending any
suit or legal proceedings brought against the
insured to enforce the insured's liability or
alleged liability on account of any loss, claim or
damage which, if established, against the insured,
would constitute a valid and collectible loss
sustained by the insured under the terms of this
bond. (R. 64) [Emphasis added]
Thus, whether or not the Bank's settlement with Clark
Tank Lines was in good faith, the claims against it,
if established, would, as demonstrated above, have
constituted a "valid and collectible lo3s."

Therefore,

even if this Court holds that the Bank, before it can
collect the amount of settlement from St. Paul, must
prove that Stoof in fact altered or forged the checks or
that the Bank's employees acted dishonestly, the Bank is
still entitled to recover its attorneys' fees, since at
least the Bank's alleged liability in the Clark Tank Lines
*/

suit was within the scope of the bond.—

This is so even if

there is a settlement where the insured's ultimate liability
may or may not have been covered by the policy depending on
the outcome of the trial.

Couch on Insurance 2d, §51:143,

50 A.L.R.2d 458, 506; St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 475 P.2d 69, 71 (Ore. 1970); St.

—'Likewise, the possibility existed that the
Bank's loss was due to Stooffs larceny and thus covered
under Clause "B" (Larceny). See Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., supra, 370 F.2d 276.
(See pp. 22-23, supra)
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Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Clarence-Raines & Co,,
335 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1972).
In Crosetti Bros., the shoe was on the other
foot.

There St. Paul was contending that Crosetti

Brothers, as indemnitor, was liable for attorney's fees
incurred by St. Paul in settling claims, one of which v/as
within the scope of the Crosetti indemnity agreement.
Whether Crosetti Brothers was liable for indemnification
depended on the manner in which the insured was liable
to a third party.

But the question of how, let alone

whether, the insured was liable to the third party was
never determined since the claim v/as settled.

In fact,

the court granted St. Paul recovery for attorneys1 fees
and costs from Crosetti Brothers even though under the
terms of the settlement, St. Paul did not even have to
pay a third party anything (the other defendant did).
Moreover, even if it can be argued that some of
the claims against the Bank were outside the scope of
the Banker's Blanket Bond, it has been held that there
is no need to allocate attorneys1 fees between claims
within the Banker's Blanket Bond coverage and those
outside the bond coverage.

See St. Paul Fire & Marine

Insurance Co. v. Kodor, 200 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1967).
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CONCLUSION
The Continental Bank and Trust Company respectfully urges this Court to reverse the trial court's grant
of Summary Judgment and Dismissal and its denial of plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and for Relief
from Judgment on the following grounds:
(1)

None of the grounds advanced before

the trial court in urging Summary Judgment and
dismissal are legally sufficient to sustain the
trial court's action.
(2)

The trial court err d in denying

plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and
for Relief from Judgment because any possible basis
for granting Summary Judgment had been removed by
the admission into the Record of plaintiff's Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories.
(3)

Plaintiff, not defendant, is entitled

to judgment on the face of the pleadings unless
defendant puts in issue the factual question of the
plaintiff's good faith in settling the claims against
the plaintiff.
(4)

Plaintiff is entitled to recover its

attorneys' fees and costs even if it must prove,
and cannot prove, that Stoof altered or forged
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the checks or that the Bank's employees acted
dishonestly.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
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